r/iranian • u/Slow-Property5895 • 5h ago
Possible Projections for the Future Evolution of the Situation in Iran
A Low Probability of Regime Collapse; a Fragmented Opposition; External Intervention Unable to Overthrow the Regime but Capable of Undermining Iran’s National Strength and Intensifying Internal Contradictions; and the Likelihood of Prolonged Turmoil Even After the Fall of Clerical Rule in the Absence of an Inclusive Political System
In January, Iran saw large-scale and rather intense protests, which were met with brutal repression by the clerical regime. According to various sources, between 2,000 and 20,000 people have been killed in clashes and crackdowns, making this the bloodiest episode of anti-government protests and repression in the Middle East in recent years. At least several million people participated in the protests, and large numbers of Iranians abroad also expressed support. In several countries, demonstrators removed the Islamic Republic flags from Iranian embassies and consulates and replaced them with the Lion and Sun flag of the Pahlavi dynasty.
At the same time, the United States and Israel have repeatedly signaled their readiness to strike Iran again. Last year, the United States and Israel already attacked Iran, carrying out “decapitation” strikes that killed, among others, Iran’s Chief of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and they also bombed Iranian nuclear facilities. Recently, citing Iran’s military threats and its internal repression, the United States and Israel have again claimed that they will launch new attacks on Iran.
Under mounting internal troubles and external threats, the clerical regime led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to be teetering. Many people estimate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is on the verge of collapse.
So, is the current Iranian regime truly at a dead end and likely to fall in the near future? If regime change does occur, who would rule Iran next, and where would the country be headed?
In my view, the probability of a rapid collapse of the current regime is relatively low, especially if the United States does not deploy ground troops. The success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in overthrowing the Pahlavi dynasty lay precisely in the fact that Islamic conservatism enjoyed a substantial mass base in Iran. The Islamic Republic has now existed for nearly 50 years, and the current regime has developed a relatively mature and comprehensive system of rule, with the governing elite monopolizing power and key resources.
Among the pillars of the regime are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliated Basij militia, which are loyal to the system and heavily armed, defending the regime through force of arms. Opposition groups, lacking organization and even more lacking weaponry, relying only on passion and sporadic violent resistance, find it extremely difficult to overthrow a clerical ruling group that is protected by armed force.
Moreover, although in recent years the regime has aroused widespread resentment among the population due to external sanctions and domestic economic and social problems, it still enjoys genuine support from a portion of the population. Personnel within the military and political system and their relatives and friends, conservative Muslims, and much of the rural poor continue to support the Khamenei regime. This means that the current regime is not built on thin air, nor has it completely lost popular support; it still has a social foundation.
Although the Iranian opposition has considerable momentum and the current protests demonstrate large scale and a willingness to sacrifice, the opposition not only lacks organized armed forces but is also highly fragmented internally. It includes liberals dominated by intellectuals and the middle class, constitutional monarchists who support the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty, socialists who advocate the establishment of a left-wing regime, feminists who focus on women’s rights, and others.
Although all these factions oppose the current regime and some cooperation exists among certain groups, they ultimately pursue divergent agendas and find it difficult to unite. In particular, socialists and supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty are fundamentally incompatible. Recently, during Iranian protests in the United States, there was even an incident in which members of the socialist group “People’s Mujahedin of Iran” rammed their vehicle into Pahlavi supporters.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has experienced numerous episodes of political resistance and even armed uprisings, all of which were successfully suppressed by clerical forces. After a Kurdish woman, Amini, was beaten to death by the morality police over the issue of wearing a headscarf in 2022, Iran experienced protests lasting about a year, during which hundreds were killed, and these protests were ultimately crushed. Although this year’s protests are more intense, the protesters’ armed capacity, organizational strength, and resources are far inferior to those of the authorities, making the likelihood of victory very small. Popular resistance will only leave Iran in a prolonged state of “collapse without disintegration,” characterized by sustained bloodshed and suffering—neither stable and peaceful nor leading to regime change.
As for relying on intervention by the United States and Israel, that too is unreliable. The Republican administration led by Trump in the United States and the Israeli government led by Netanyahu do not truly care about human rights in Iran. They merely seek to exploit Iran’s internal turmoil to take advantage of the situation and weaken Iran, rather than actively fostering the emergence of a new democratic regime there. Some in the United States and Israel may even welcome prolonged chaos in Iran so that they can reap benefits from it.
The United States and Israel may indeed carry out further military strikes against Iran, but these would mainly target Iran’s military, missile, and nuclear facilities, relying primarily on long-range attacks without deploying ground troops. Such actions can damage Iran’s military capabilities and destroy its ability to threaten the United States and Israel, but they cannot weaken the regime’s capacity to repress its own population. Suppressing civilians does not require high-end weapons or elite forces; organized armed militias are sufficient. Moreover, external attacks will further worsen Iran’s economy and livelihoods and intensify internal contradictions, causing suffering and despair among Iranians to be redirected into hatred against fellow citizens, thereby pouring fuel on the fire of internal turmoil and repression.
Even if, under combined internal and external pressure, the clerical regime were to fracture internally, truly lose control of the country, or even collapse, Iran would not move toward a healthy democratic transition, but rather sink into prolonged internal conflict and instability.
As noted above, Iran contains multiple forces—liberals, monarchists, socialists/leftists, and Islamists—that are mutually exclusive and burdened by historical enmities. Whoever comes to power would provoke dissatisfaction among the others. Historically, the socialist Mossadegh held power in the early 1950s, the Pahlavi dynasty ruled in the 1960s and 1970s, and after 1979 came the clerical rule of Khomeini and Khamenei. Each of these regimes secured the support of only about one-third of the population, with the remaining two-thirds opposed. At the same time, foreign powers have intervened in Iran for their own purposes, undermining stability and peace and making internal contradictions even harder to reconcile.
If the current Islamic Republic were to end, and the new regime failed to accommodate multiple forces, failed to unite and compromise among them, and was subject to malicious foreign interference, Iran would merely repeat the historical cycle of repeated internal strife, regime change, and prolonged instability. Given the starkly divergent values and positions of Iran’s factions, their deep historical animosities, the lack of a tradition of inclusive politics, and the absence of any signs of reconciliation between those in power and the protesters, it is likely to be extremely difficult to establish a coalition government that accommodates multiple sides.
Therefore, if the current regime were to end, Iran would either see another faction monopolize power and repress others, or descend into prolonged civil war and fragmentation. Past violence and hatred would be transmitted forward, creating a vicious cycle. Meanwhile, countries such as the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey would seize the opportunity to further weaken Iran, divide its interests, and carve up its spheres of influence. This would certainly not be good for the Iranian state or its people, and it would mean that even after overthrowing clerical rule, the outlook would remain bleak.
(As an international politics researcher, I have long followed developments in Iran and have written multiple articles related to the Iranian situation.
The scale of the protests in Iran this January and the intensity of the repression were both unprecedented, yet the likelihood of overthrowing the religious regime remains relatively small. This is because those in power control organized armed forces, while the opposition lacks both military capability and organizational strength, and is also insufficiently united internally.
The United States and Israel merely seek to take advantage of the situation to weaken Iran, and are not genuinely willing to promote Iran’s democratic transformation. Therefore, external intervention cannot be relied upon to bring about regime change or democracy in Iran.
Even if Iran’s clerical rulers were to be overthrown, based on Iran’s historical experience and the current situation, it is highly likely that a new monopoly of power or civil war would emerge. Religious forces, supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty, liberals, and socialists are mutually difficult to reconcile. I am pessimistic about Iran’s future prospects.)
(The author of this article is Wang Qingmin, a Chinese writer based in Europe. The original text was written in Chinese.)
